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28 April 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director

for Operations

FROM : Donald P. Gregg

Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight

SUBJECT : Talking Points Paper for DDCI

1. Attached hereto is a Talking Points paper for the DDCI to use with SSCI Staff Director William Miller next week.


2. Also attached for the DDCI's information is a Memorandum for the Record dealing with Mr. Miller's perceptions of the Directorate's sensitive collection program.

Donald P. Gregg

Att

MORI/CDF

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Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP81M00980R002100020061-0 TALKING POINTS

Background

The SSCI's request for a voluminous and detailed report of the Directorate of Operation's clandestine human source collection activities comes at a pivotal time in the Agency's relations with Congress. We have now dealt with the SSCI for about two years in a forthcoming and cooperative manner. the SSCI to request the great amount of detail, which is embodied in their recommendations on the FY79 NFIP, seems both unjustifiable and unnecessary. If we accede, we will continue to place ourselves in an overly submissive posture toward Congress thereby delaying indefinitely the time when we can move into a more collegial relationship with the oversight committees. At the same time, the Directorate needs to recognize that one of the murky areas in the SSCI's perception of CIA operations is clandestine collection. Our objective should be to help the SSCI become more familiar with and confident in our internal decision-making processes without laying bare our entire covert collection apparatus. well have to go through the same procedure with the HPSCI in the near future. (See attached Memorandum for the Record in which Bill Miller articulates the current SSCI perception of the Directorate's clandestine collection operations.)

- To respond to the SSCI request, as now formulated, would require us to describe the operating directives, clandestine assets and ongoing costs over the next five years of every Station in the world.
- To respond in this amount of detail would go far beyond oversight into "micro-management" of CIA by the SSCI.
- The amount of detail would be so voluminous as to make it impossible for SSCI membership to draw overall conclusions about our clandestine operations.
- A practical result would be that staffers would focus on specific operations in individual Stations, paving the way for detailed operational questions and second-guessing from those who lack professional qualifications in the intelligence field.



- Risk of leaks would increase exponentially.
- What we are willing to do is:
- a. describe in detail the objectives, targets and assets of three Stations, one small, one medium and one large, without specifically identifying them;
- b. present some actual case studies which lay out the ways in which difficult operational decisions are made on clandestine collection operations where both risks and gains are high;
- c. present, as requested, an evaluation of the contribution of the DO's clandestine collection operations to finished intelligence;
- d. present, as requested, a qualitative assessment of the value and effectiveness of our clandestine collection operations;
- e. discuss and explain in the context of current State/CIA relationships, how the Directorate is becoming more and more exclusively focused on collection targets which cannot be approached through overt means;
- f. present, as requested, funding projections by operating division for the next five years;
- g. pass to the SSCI the recently completed investigation of the DO by the House Appropriations Committee which looked exhaustedly into some of these same matters.

